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on every occasion, so not every case of failing to help observed in these
experiments is contrary to virtue.
Adams claims that there is a great deal of moral luck in the development of any person’s character so that virtue is to a very large measure a
gift, rather than an individual achievement; nonetheless, virtue is excellent and admirable.
This is an outstanding book, one of the very best books ever written on
this most important topic. It is required reading for anyone interested in the
virtues or ethical theory. Adams’s many examples are very apt and helpful; some of his observations about them are gems—marvels of insight and
good sense. Adams’s book is also very clear and lucid, unusually clear and
accessible for such an important contribution to philosophy. This makes it
very suitable for use in upper division undergraduate courses. This book
deserves a wide readership by philosophers and students of philosophy.

The Will to Imagine: A Justification of Sceptical Religion, by J. L. Schellenberg.
Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press, 2009.
AKU VISALA, Oxford University
The Will to Imagine (henceforth Will) is the latest installment in J. L.
Schellenberg’s trilogy on philosophy of religion. In the two previous
books, Prolegomena to a Philosophy of Religion (2005) and The Wisdom to
Doubt: A Justification of Religious Scepticism (2007), Schellenberg strongly
criticised most classical and contemporary arguments for belief in God. In
philosophy of religion circles, Schellenberg is probably best known for his
earlier work Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason (1993), in which he presents his famous argument against theism from the hiddenness of God.
The argument from hiddenness has since created a great deal of debate
and Schellenberg himself has defended it in several different forums. The
reader of these books and his other works might easily get the impression
that Schellenberg seeks to abandon all possible forms of religion and advocate some form of naturalism. But this, as Will shows, is far from being
the case.
The book is basically what the title says it is: an attempt to defend a certain kind of religious attitude—an attitude that is neither belief in some
sort of God nor belief in the non-existence of God or gods. Schellenberg
has set out to formulate a third position between these two alternatives.
This middle position, however, is not strictly speaking an agnostic one as
one might first think but a religious one—a sceptical religious attitude.
Instead of religious or non-religious belief, Schellenberg suggests that faith
would be a more proper attitude. The proper object of faith is what he
calls ultimism. Ultimism is what
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all . . . religious propositions can be seen as gesturing toward: that what is
deepest in reality (metaphysically ultimate) is also unsurpassably great (axiologically ultimate) and the source of ultimate good (salvific). (xii)

Ultimism, according to Schellenberg, is the common core of most religions
and it can be extracted from the particularities and historical claims of individual religious traditions. Faith in ultimism can survive the philosophical
challenges that belief in God cannot, and it can also provide grounds for
a truly religious way of life. Such are the claims that Schellenberg seeks to
defend in his book.
The book consists of five parts. In the first part, “Purifying Faith,” he clarifies the notion of ultimism, examines objections to it and lays the groundwork for understanding the difference between believing and having faith.
Here he devotes a considerable number of pages to establishing that faith
in ultimism can support a robust religious form of life and religious commitment. In part 2, “Testing Faith,” Schellenberg introduces his criteria for
justified faith commitments and argues that his sceptical religion and faith
in ultimism are indeed justified as far as reason can judge.
Parts 3 and 4 (“Renewing Faith”) do most of the philosophical heavy
lifting. There Schellenberg cleverly uses most traditional arguments—
both epistemic and non-epistemic—to argue for ultimism instead of theism. He is convinced that when understood properly the arguments for
belief in the existence of God actually turn out to be arguments for faith
in ultimism. Finally, in the last part, “Keeping Faith,” Schellenberg pulls it
all together and examines different modes of religious attitudes. His argument there is that faith in ultimism can provide a kind of religious vision
that unifies personal, moral, aesthetic and intellectual aspects of life.
In Will, Schellenberg in building on the conclusions he made in his two
previous books. There he argued that religious scepticism is the only reasonable alternative for people in our situation. His scepticism consists of
two components: categorical scepticism and capacity scepticism. First of
all, our limitations as human beings preclude us from having knowledge
about religious issues. Our epistemic situation is such that there are no
reasons available to us to warrant religious belief. Schellenberg calls this
categorical scepticism and says that it consists of having an attitude of
doubt or disbelief towards the proposition that “there is truth in religion.”
Capacity scepticism, on the other hand, is a view according to which we
are at a point in our development as humanity such that we do not have
the cognitive capacities and other relevant properties required to obtain
basic truths about either the existence of ultimate reality or the details
concerning its nature. Schellenberg sees human knowledge, both scientific
and religious, as works in progress: there might be “hundreds of millions
of years that may remain for reason and also religion to be developed further” (xii). In the light of the future development of religion, Schellenberg
claims that the detailed claims about God and gods of current religious
traditions are premature and scepticism is the proper attitude with respect
to such propositions. Schellenberg’s view is that with respect to truth in
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religion, reason leads to the conclusion that we are unable to know whether
there are such truths. As a consequence, we should refrain from believing
anything about religious matters.
Thus, Schellenberg’s religious scepticism does not correspond to atheism, if we define atheism as a view according to which we should believe
that God does not exist. Nor does it amount to metaphysical naturalism.
Schellenberg thinks that
the popular bipolarizing stance that says one must accept either a conservative believing form of religion or an irreligious naturalism has embraced a
misleading and false antithesis. . . . If I am right, naturalistic belief is every
bit as unjustified as believing religion. (252)

Belief in naturalism is not where reason leads us, but rather it leads us to
scepticism. Such scepticism, Schellenberg claims, is not the end of rational religion, but its beginning. A set of core claims can be extracted from
religions—a purified religious vision—that we can have faith in, but not
belief. This is what he means by ultimism. Let us now look at what exactly
Schellenberg means by “faith in ultimism” and how it differs from both
religious belief and religious disbelief.
Schellenberg sees a common core in all religion. According to this core
set of propositions—what Schellenberg calls ultimism—there “is (metaphysically and axiologically) ultimate reality in relation to which an ultimate good can be attained” (15). He distinguishes this simple ultimism
from qualified versions of this view of particular religions that add different sorts of details to the simply ultimist picture. Theism, for example,
conceives the ultimate reality as personal, causally efficacious and maximally powerful. The reason why simple ultimism is better than its qualified competitors is that qualified ultimism leads to sectarianism and exclusivism. There are big differences not only among religions, but inside
religions as well. In addition, adding more properties to ultimate reality
makes it more liable to contradictions and instability. By removing the
details of particular qualified ultimistic views, Schellenberg claims that
we get a purified form of a core set of religious propositions that is open
to different kinds of interpretations. But religion is not just having faith or
belief in certain propositions, but rather
religion should . . . be understood as involving a commitment fundamental
among one’s commitment to cultivate dispositions appropriate for the states
of affairs represented by ultimism, which either in belief or in faith one takes
to obtain: religious persons . . . make central to their lives the project of conforming how they live to the standards suggested by there being an ultimate
reality in relation to which an ultimate good can be attained. (18)

The proper attitude towards simple ultimism is faith, not belief. Much
of Will’s argument rests on this—quite unorthodox—distinction of faith
and belief, so let us examine it next. In short, Schellenberg understands
belief as a passive attitude and faith as an active, imaginative attitude.
To have a belief that p is for a subject S to think that the state of affairs
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reported by p obtains. Such an attitude is passive: S automatically experiences the world in such a way that p obtains: Schellenberg would say that
the evidence causes S to see the world in a certain way. Faith, however, is
a more active attitude for S than belief. For S to have faith that p is for S to
wilfully assent that p in a situation where S believes that the state of affairs
that p represents is good and desirable, but where one lacks belief in p. To
assent to a proposition, according to Schellenberg, is to adhere to a certain
policy: going along with the propositions and imagining that the world is
like that. This assent is an act of will in the face of insufficient evidence; it
is not passively caused by evidence like belief. Thus in belief you accept
p passively, in faith you wilfully and imaginatively represent to yourself
that p obtains and behave accordingly. To have ultimistic religious faith
means for S that S
finds herself without evidence sufficient to cause belief in these propositions [ultimism] (recognizing that they may be false or perhaps even in some
hidden way incoherent), but positively evaluating the states of affairs they
report, she nonetheless tenaciously pictures or imagines the world to herself
as a world in which they are true and committedly gives her assent to what
is thus held before the mind. (35)

Ultimistic religious faith can then be taken as a ground for religion and
religious practices of different kinds. If the faithful ultimist will then commit to shaping her life to align with the standards that flow from ultimism,
then the faithful ultimist is indeed religious in Schellenberg’s sense. Faith
in ultimism is, thus, a genuine religious attitude, but regardless of her
commitment, the faithful ultimist, if asked, would not say that ultimism
is true.
If this is what having ultimistic religion means, why should we practice
it? If there is no evidence for ultimism, why have faith in it? Schellenberg’s
answer is that there are positive arguments that reveal how valuable and
good the states of affairs that ultimism reports actually are. If we have good
reasons to think that the existence of a metaphysically ultimate reality that
is also unsurpassably good is indeed an extremely good thing (that is, valuable human goals are fulfilled if the world turns out to be like that), then
ultimistic faith should follow. This is the function of parts three and four of
Will. The interesting thing here is that Schellenberg basically refits classical
evidential and non-evidential arguments for belief in God to arguments
for having ultimistic faith. He discusses the ontological, cosmological and
teleological arguments as well as the non-evidential arguments of Kant,
Pascal and James. Next, I will describe just a few points about these arguments so as to give the gist of Schellenberg’s reasoning.
In the hands of Schellenberg, Anselm’s ontological reasoning, for instance, leads to the idea that since our alignment with the maximally
valuable ultimate reality is intrinsically so incredibly valuable, we should
assent to the possibility of such a reality. With respect to the cosmological argument, Schellenberg claims that its underlying principle is the
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complete rationality and the possibility of a complete understanding of
the world. If ultimism is the case, then the world is indeed rational and
understandable and this state of affairs would be extremely valuable to us
humans. The existence of a complete and accessible truth would promote
a relentless human pursuit of truth. If “no human form of life is rationally
sufficient unless it allows one to pursue the conjunction of our various
understanding related aims in the best possible way” (123) then ultimistic
faith is, again, a justified response to such propositions. Similar reasoning
is applied to the teleological argument as well: having faith in ultimism
preserves our concern with the beauty and order of the natural world and
would motivate us to protect the natural world.
Non-evidential arguments for belief in God are also absorbed into
Schellenberg’s argument. Schellenberg’s own faith in ultimism is very
close to that of William James: the title of Schellenberg’s Will is an homage
to James’s The Will to Believe. Will describes James’s idea of the faith-ladder
that begins from the acknowledgement of the possibility of an extremely
valuable states of affairs (such as ultimism in some form or another) and
concludes that since such states ought to be true, one should hold that
such states of affairs “shall be true, at any rate true for me.” For James, it
is our good will that is the source of our religious attitudes, not our intellect. This, of course, is something with which Schellenberg agrees wholeheartedly. In addition, Schellenberg highlights the fact that at no point
in his defence of wilful religious attitude does James invoke the truth of
religious propositions. Finally, Schellenberg also praises James for the fact
that, instead of theism, his religious attitude was directed towards a more
general “religious hypothesis” according to which there is an ultimate
reality in communion with which we will achieve our ultimate goal. Although James is very difficult to interpret at some points, Schellenberg
sees him as his closest ally in the search for a new, sceptical but passionate
religious alternative.
Since simple ultimism and the “religious hypothesis” of James ought
to be true because they satisfy human desire for certain goods, we should
passionately and imaginatively assent to them. If simple ultimism is true,
then it will realise a wide array of human goods: the alignment with the
ultimate and the possibility of understanding and the respect for beauty,
for instance. As these goods realise valuable human goals, they are so desirable and valuable to us that their possible existence warrants us to have
faith that they really exist and that we should live as if ultimism were true
(although knowing that we can never believe it to be true). It is simply the
extremely great value of the states of affairs represented by ultimism that
should drive us wilfully to assent to ultimism.
Next I will raise some questions and issues that seem to me to be problematic in the argument of Will. The first question has to do with the
justification of religious scepticism. Of course, Will simply begins by
assuming that Schellenberg’s case for scepticism is sound. But Will nevertheless rests on the inevitability of religious scepticism. If it turns out to be
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the case that there is indeed good evidence for certain religious beliefs, say,
theism, then belief that God exists would be a more appropriate attitude,
not faith. Faith comes into play only when there is no evidence available,
or rather when there is good reason to think that no evidence will ever be
available for propositions about ultimate reality because of our cognitive
and developmental limitations. Several of Schellenberg’s arguments for
religious scepticism (the divine hiddenness argument, for instance) have
been critically discussed in the philosophy of religion literature and their
conclusions do not seem self-evidently clear. But this is not really the topic
of Will, so it need not be discussed here.
Second, we might grant Schellenberg that it would be desirable that ultimism obtained in some form or another. But then a question arises: even
if it would be extremely desirable that ultimism obtained, would we not
deceive ourselves somehow if we wilfully assented to ultimism and lived
as if it were true? The intuition that many people, especially philosophers,
have is that non-evidential arguments are never enough to warrant such a
commitment. It seems quite difficult to resist the idea that the religion of
the faithful ultimist is simply a fancy form of wishful thinking: the faithful ultimist looks at the world and by the use of her reason concludes
that there is no good evidence for the existence of an ultimate reality, but
nevertheless she considers the existence of such a reality and our alignment with it so valuable that she nevertheless decides to imagine that this
is how things really are and lives accordingly. It is difficult to see how the
arguments of Will could dislodge this intuition; religious scepticism, thus,
does seem to lead to the rejection of all religious (and anti-religious) attitudes. Some believing atheists openly confess that the existence of a god,
gods, God or some other ultimate might be preferable to naturalism, that
is, the world would be better (more valuable or good) if such things existed. Without such entities or realities, extremely valuable human goals and
desires might very well be left unfulfilled (justice, love, peace, progress,
for instance), but since they do not see how the existence of such realities
could be possible, they reject both faith and belief in anything “ultimate”
behind the natural world. Atheists such as the British philosopher John
Gray see religious scepticism as true, but not intrinsically valuable. In
order to convince such atheists, Schellenberg would need to show that
their response to ultimistic propositions is flawed. But it is difficult to see
how this would happen without Schellenberg resorting to reasons for the
truth of such propositions (which he cannot do because of his scepticism),
not just to considerations about the desirability or value of the possible
truth of ultimism.
Finally, reasons for faith have to be quite strong to provide motivation for the continuous exercise of the will and imagination. In belief, as
Schellenberg understands it, the evidence causes the subject to see the
world in a certain way, so there is no need for exercising the will to assent
to propositions that are believed. In faith, however, the subject has to continuously wilfully assent and imagine that ultimism is true even when the

358

Faith and Philosophy

subject knows that there is really no evidence for ultimism. If there is no
evidence for the truth of ultimism, questions can be raised about whether
such wilful assenting is psychologically too demanding to uphold. Our
reasons for belief in the desirability of ultimism need to be extremely good
to make the continuous effort of exercising our imagination worthwhile.
Schellenberg answers this objection to some extent (chapter 3) by claiming
that imagination combined with different kinds of religious practices is
enough to support commitment in ultimism without belief. But if this is
the case, what would motivate the faithful ultimist to engage in (sceptical)
religious practices in the first place, if not some kind of belief? It is difficult
to see where the initial motivation comes from if not from some kind of
intuition or evidence “that there might be (some) truth to religion.”
Despite these open questions and issues, it must be acknowledged that
Schellenberg has indeed been able to create a truly alternative position to
those currently motivating most philosophy of religion. By doing so, he
is deeply grounded in a tradition of Western philosophy that emphasises
the pragmatic and non-evidential aspect of religion and also represents a
contemporary reinvigoration of this tradition.

Metaphysics and God: Essays in Honor of Eleonore Stump, edited by Kevin
Timpe. New York: Routledge, 2009. 262 pages. $126 (hardback).
JOSEPH SHAW, St Benet’s Hall, Oxford University
The fourteen essays in this collection illustrate the range of interests of
Eleonore Stump, in whose honor they have been written. While it would
be impossible in a review to give a proper assessment of every paper, I
shall pick out some contrasting examples with a view to saying something
about the development of the discipline under Stump’s influence, illustrated by the collection as a whole.
Some of the essays here display a degree of precision which even the
most demanding analytic philosopher could not fault. Brian Leftow’s
“Aquinas, Divine Simplicity and Divine Freedom” and Thomas Flint’s
“Fittingness and Divine Action in Cur Deus Homo” are careful, dense, and
acute discussions of some very knotty problems.
In order to get to grips with his chosen problem, as a problem within
the Thomist system (though certainly not only within that system), Leftow
has to get to grips with Aquinas’s logical presuppositions, which include
the idea that events become necessary when they are in the past. Leftow
is to be commended for making clear (if not simple) the relationship between what Aquinas says, and the way we might express it.
This is a mere prologue, however, to the actual problem of divine simplicity and freedom, which turns on whether and in what precise way,
God might differ in different possible worlds, on Thomist principles. This

